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Prescription Ethics: Can States Protect Pharmacists
Who Refuse to Dispense Contraceptive Prescriptions?
Maryam T. Afif

I. Introduction
Recently several states have passed legislation that protects a
pharmacist from being fired if he or she refuses to dispense prescribed
birth control because of a "conscience" objection. While legislation to
protect the conscience of healthcare providers has existed since the early
1970s, only recently has it been applied to pharmacists and to birth
control. This comment discusses the deficiencies of this legislation from
two perspectives: first, the adverse impact on women's established legal
rights that results from this legislation; and second, the loophole the
legislation creates for pharmacists to escape their professional and legal
obligations.
By the 1960s it seemed as though women had finally won a long
fought battle to legally access contraceptives-including the newly
introduced birth control pill. In a series of cases the Supreme Court
found that women have a fundamental right to privacy with regard to
matters of contraception and that this right is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Once established, this right was rarely challenged.
Recently, however, pharmacists who do not believe in the use of birth
. J.D. Candidate 2006, Pace University School of Law. The author is grateful for the
assistance of the members of Pace Law Review, especially the Executive Board. The
author also thanks her friends and family who have put up with her for the last three
years, most especially Fred Wendte. Professors Bennett Gershman and Bridget Crawford
provided a tremendous supply of insight and assistance with this article, for which the
author is extremely grateful. Any errors are the author's own. This article is in loving
memory of Carla A. Afif.
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control have been refusing to dispense prescriptions for contraceptives
and have been seeking refuge from the consequences of their actions
through state legislation. In states that accommodate these pharmacists,
women may effectively be denied access to birth control and will be left
without a legal remedy. Legislation that denies women access to
contraceptives presents an impermissible infringement upon their
constitutional right to privacy. Accordingly, it should be challenged on
substantive due process grounds.
Part II of this comment discusses the history of birth control and the
laws relating to birth control and abortion. Part III discusses the current
legislation and presents examples of pharmacists who have refused to
dispense valid birth control prescriptions. This part also discusses the
alleged "connection" between birth control and abortion and how this
argument is used to defend conscience legislation. Part IV discusses the
traditional legal approaches to handling pharmacists who refuse to
dispense or who dispense incorrectly. Part V discusses the arguments for
and against legal protection of pharmacists. Finally, Part VI discusses
the legal consequences of continuing to protect pharmacists at the
expense of women's health and rights and suggests causes of action for
future plaintiffs.
II. History of Birth Control and Legal Rights to Access
For centuries, people have devised different methods of preventing
pregnancy. 1 In the 1830s, contraceptive devices, such as condoms and
abortifacients, started to be advertised in the United States.2 This
advertising and increased marketing marked the beginning of the
contraceptive industry.3 Soon after, a variety of contraceptive devices
became commercially available to consumers.4 This accessibility did not
sit well with everyone. Moral crusaders and religious organizations, who
did not believe in the practice of birth control, began collaborating to
banish the sale of birth control items.5 Probably the most famous of
these moral crusaders is Anthony Comstock. In the 1870s Comstock
6
launched a campaign against pornography and immoral behavior.
1. For an excellent study of the history of contraceptives see ANDREA TONE,
DEVICES AND DESIRES: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA (2001).

2. Id. at 14.
3. Id.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6.Id.
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Comstock also helped found the New York Society for the Suppression
of Vice and the Watch and Ward Society of Boston.7 Comstock took his
campaign against vice to Congress and in 1873 Congress passed the
"Comstock Act." 8 The Comstock Act banned the distribution, by mail,
of obscene books, or other publications of allegedly indecent character,
as well as "any article or thing designed or intended for the prevention of
conception or producing of abortion." 9 With a few exceptions the Act
essentially made the birth control business illegal.10 In response to the
federal legislation, several states enacted "mini-Comstock" acts that
further criminalized birth control or abortions.1 These acts, however,
did little to deter the crusaders and entrepreneurs who fought for women
to have access to contraceptives and who sought to make improvements
to existing contraceptive methods.
The origin of the birth control pill can be traced to two women who
plotted its development. 2 By 1917, Margaret Sanger was already a
tireless crusader for the birth control movement when she met Katharine
McCormick, a scientist and philanthropist.1 3 The two worked together
on issues of female emancipation and universal suffrage off and on
In 1950,
throughout the early part of the twentieth century.1 4
McCormick agreed to fund further birth control research, in part, to

7. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 n.10 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8. Comstock Act, 18 U.S.C. 334 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 1461 (2005)).
For a discussion see Kathi L. Kern, "The Cornerstoneof a New Civilization": The First
International Council of Women and the Campaign for "Social Purity ",84 KY. L.J.
1235, 1247 n.39 (1995-1996) ("The Comstock Act was debated in the U.S. Congress in
December of 1872 and passed into law in March, 1873. Theoretically, the legislation was
intended to curb the sale and distribution of obscene material; a cause supported by many
suffragists and social purity advocates. In actuality, the law was used to prosecute
women's rights leaders who spoke openly of adultery and sexual exploitation. Perhaps
the most famous (and notorious) application of Comstock was its use as the legal basis
for the repeated arrest and prosecution of birth control advocate Margaret Sanger."). Id.
9. TONE, supra note 1, at 22; see also J. E. Leonarz, Annotation, Validity of
Regulations as to Contraceptives or the Dissemination of Birth ControlInformation, 96
A.L.R.2d 955 (2001) (describing the federal act and its application in the states).
10. TONE, supra note 1, at 23; see also Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582 (Conn.
1942) (A Connecticut statute prohibited a physician from prescribing contraceptive
devices to married women. This was later challenged in Griswold v. Connecticut, infra
note 22).
11. TONE, supra note 1, at 23; see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 515 (Douglas's dissent
which discusses the history of Comstock-influenced legislation).
12. TONE, supra note 1, at 204.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 205.
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address the growing population crisis. 15 Due to Sanger's activism and
McCormick's financing, Gregory Pincus received the support needed to
research and invent what became the birth control pill ("the pill"). 16 In
May 1960, the Food and Drug Administration approved the pill for use
as a contraceptive, and soon after, the pill was made available to the
public. 17
The introduction of the birth control pill was a watershed moment in
women's cultural history. The release of the birth control pill has been
attributed to the start of the "sexual revolution," and it resulted in8
sweeping cultural and political changes as well as legal controversy.'
Within five years of its coming on the market, nearly six million women
were taking the pill.1 9 In spite of its popularity, the pill was a prohibited
contraceptive in states that had, years earlier, enacted Comstock
legislation. 20 Connecticut, in particular, had some of the most severe
statutes controlling access to contraceptives. Connecticut law made it a
criminal offense to use drugs or devices designed to prevent
conception.2 1 In spite of the harsh penalties, these statutes did not deter
the women and men who wanted access to a viable and effective means
of birth control. Accordingly, many of the state statutes restricting birth
control were challenged. In several landmark cases in the 1960s and
1970s, various plaintiffs went to court claiming these statutes were
unconstitutional.22 The result was a series of Supreme Court holdings
that established that people have a fundamental right to privacy with
regard to issues of contraception.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,24 the directors of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut were convicted of violating a
15. Id. at 207.
16. Id. at 204.
17. Id.

at 203; see also Oral Contraceptive History-Birth Control Pills,

http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blthepill.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
18. TONE, supra note 1, at 233.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-32 (repealed 1971).
22. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Baird v.
Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
23. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 438.
24. 381 U.S. at 479. The holding of this case was, in many ways, foreshadowed by
Justice Douglas' dissent in Poe: "I am also clear that this Connecticut law as applied to

this married couple deprives them of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept
is used in the Fourteenth Amendment." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961).
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Connecticut statute that made the use and distribution of contraceptives a
criminal offense.25 The directors provided information, instruction, and
medical advice about contraceptives to their married clients. 26 The
defendants appealed their conviction on the ground that the statute was
an invasion of the constitutional rights of their clients.27 The Supreme
Court agreed and reversed the defendants' conviction.28 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court described the penumbrae of rights created by the
Bill of Rights and found that the relationship of married persons lies
"within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.,29 The Court noted that while the state could constitutionally
regulate the manufacture or sale of contraceptives, it could not forbid
their use.30 The Court noted that "[s]uch a law cannot stand in light of
the familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a
'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."' 31 Griswold established that married couples have a right to
be protected from state inquiry into their sexual activities. It also created
a right to "privacy" that, while not explicit in the Constitution, became
the basis for many critical holdings following this decision: "[w]hile, as
recognized in [several cases, including Griswold], the Federal
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the
Supreme Court has declared that the right of32privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.,
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of a single woman's right to

25. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. The statute stated "'[a]ny person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned.' . . . 'Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and
punished as if he were the principal offender."' Id. (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-32
and 54-196).
26. Id. at 480.
27. Id. at 479.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 485.
30. Id.
31. Id. (internal citation omitted).
32. Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to the FederalLegal
Aspects of the Right to Privacy, 43 L. Ed. 2d 871, § 2 (2004) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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access contraceptives in Eisenstadt v. Baird.33 In Eisenstadt, a man was
convicted of giving contraceptive foam to an unmarried woman. 34 The
Massachusetts law in controversy prohibited single women from
accessing contraceptives for the purpose of preventing pregnancy.3 5 The
Court held that "the statute, viewed as a prohibition on contraception per
se, violates the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 36 The Court went on to say that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child., 3' Eisenstadt also noted that while the statute in
question failed the reasonable basis test the appropriate test for cases
involving fundamental rights would be strict scrutiny.38
In Baird v. Lynch 39 a single woman was not allowed to purchase
contraceptives at a local drug store.40 She brought suit to question the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute which imposed a fine or
imprisonment on anyone who made contraceptives available for use in
connection with premarital sexual intercourse. 4 1 The court found the
statute violated the fundamental interest of unmarried women to prevent
pregnancy and held it was unconstitutional. The court summarized the
previous cases dealing with this issue and stated that "[t]he right of
privacy includes activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, abortion, and possession of obscene materials. 'A2
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Carey v. Population Services,

33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 440.
36. Id. at 443.
37. Id. at 453 (emphasis in the original).
38. Id. at 447 n.7
[I]f we were to conclude that the . . . statute impinges upon fundamental
freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification would have to be not
merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the
achievement of a compelling state interest... we do not have to address the
statute's validity under that test because the law fails to satisfy even the more
lenient equal protection standard.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
39. 390 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 751 (internal citations omitted).
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International.43 In Carey, the Court held that a New York statute
prohibiting distribution of certain contraceptives and prohibiting the
advertisement and display of contraceptives violated the defendant's
right of privacy, which was protected under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 The Court declared the statute invalid as
an unconstitutional suppression of expression protected by the First
Amendment.4 5 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on Griswold and
its progeny, and stated that "the Constitution protects individual
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the
State. Restrictions on the distribution of contraceptives clearly burden
the freedom to make such decisions.

46

The Court later used this

reasoning to lift a ban by the United States Post Office preventing
advertising of contraceptives through the mail. "[A]dvertising for
contraceptives not only implicates 'substantial individual and societal
interests' in the free flow of commercial information, but also relates to
activity which is protected from unwarranted state interference. ' ' 7
By the early 1970s it seemed clear that the right of an individual to
use and access contraceptives was a fundamental, constitutionally
protected right. 48 The Court's reasoning in cases such as Griswold and
Eisenstadt became the cornerstone of the plaintiffs' argument in Roe v.
Wade, 49 arguably one of the most controversial cases decided in the later
half of the twentieth century. 50 At issue in Roe was a state statute which
prohibited abortions. 51 The Court held that the right to have an abortion
was protected under the umbrella of privacy and autonomy, although it

43. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
44. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
45. Id.
46, Id. at 687.
47. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (internal citations
omitted). In later cases, however, plaintiffs would be unsuccessful in trying to expand
the rights granted in Carey to other matters, such as marriage. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins,
533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
48. Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740, 751 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. As of this writing there have been more than 7000 law review articles
discussing Roe v. Wade and the issue of whether or not the case should be overturned is
debated almost daily in the media.
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
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recognized the state's power to regulate abortion.52 The Court concluded
"that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that
this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation." 53 This holding helped establish the test for
government restrictions on fundamental rights:
As a general proposition, the court, [in Roe], stated that some state
regulation in areas protected by the right to privacy is appropriate; and that
where "fundamental rights," such as the right of privacy, are involved, any
state regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling
state interest," and legislative enactments regulating such rights must be
narrowly
drawn so as to express only the legitimate state interests at
54
stake.

In 1992, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey 5 partially overruled Roe. In Casey, a divided Court overturned
some aspects of Roe, including the notion that abortion is a fundamental
right. 56 The essential holding of Roe was, however, upheld: a woman has
the right to choose to have an abortion without state interference.5 7 The
Court continued, however, to acknowledge the states' right to regulate
abortion and to protect their citizens' rights to object to procedures that
offend their conscience.58 In the current political climate, some states
seem to be testing just how far they can take their powers of regulation
and conscience protection.5 9
Although the abortion issue continues to be hotly debated in
political and religious arenas, it is, at least for now, legally settled that a
state cannot interfere with a woman's right to privacy over matters of
contraception. In the past 40 years, oral contraceptives have become part
52. Id.
53. Id. at 154.
54. Schopler, supra note 32 (internal citations omitted).
55. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
56. Id. This is a simplification of a very complicated case.
For a more
comprehensive discussion of the history of abortion cases and the impact of Casey see
David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An HistoricalPerspective, 62
ALB. L. REv. 833 (1999).
57. Id.
58. Id. "A woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
59. See Lisa Chamberlain, Marchingfor Their Lives, SALON.COM, Apr. 21, 2004
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/04/21/womens-lives
(discussing proposed
legislation in 14 states to ban abortion outright).
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of the cultural mainstream. The pill is nationally advertised and
discussed with regularity on television and in books, magazines and, in
many districts, in school health classes. Oral contraceptives are the most
frequently prescribed contraceptive in America and have become a
permanent fixture in our society. 60 Even the federal government has
recognized the place the pill has in society. For example, in 1997,
Senators Olympia Snowe and Harry Reid proposed the Equity in
Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC) which
requires coverage for contraceptives by nationwide, private,
employment-related insurance plans.6' In 1998, Congress agreed to
provide contraceptive coverage to the 2,000,000 women who participate
in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (the largest
employer-sponsored health insurance plan in the world).62 Congress also
found that contraceptive services are part of basic health care, allowing
families to both adequately space desired pregnancies and avoid
unintended pregnancy. 63 In the wake of the EPICC findings, an
increasing number of states have passed legislation requiring insurance
carriers to provide prescription contraceptive coverage for their plans
that cover prescription medicine.64
60. Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discriminationwithin the Reproductive Health Care
System: Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 177 (1998-1999). "The five
most commonly used FDA approved contraceptive methods include contraceptive pills,
intrauterine devices (IUD's), Depo-Provera shots, Norplant inserts and diaphragms." Id.
61. Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 2001, S.
104, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter EPICC Bill] (further noting the finding of the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that an employer's failure to
include insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives in an employee health benefits
plan, when it covers other prescription drugs and devices, constitutes unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); See also Rachel Benson
Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insurance Coverage of
Contraception, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, Vol. 1, No. 4, Aug. 1998,
availableat http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/01/4/grO lO405.html.
62. EPICC Bill, supra note 61.
63. Id. Congress further found that by reducing rates of unintended pregnancy,
contraceptives help reduce the need for abortion. Unintended pregnancies lead to higher
rates of infant mortality, low-birth weight, and maternal morbidity, and threaten the
economic viability of families. The National Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality
determined that "infant mortality could be reduced by 10 percent if all women not
desiring pregnancy used contraception." Id.
64. Breena M. Roos, Note, The Quest for Equality: Comprehensive Insurance
Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1289, 1298 (2002). In
California, the Women's Contraception Equity Act (WCEA) requires employers who
offer prescription drugs to also cover prescription contraceptives. In Catholic Charities
of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), the Act withstood a
constitutional challenge from a religious employer with the court finding the statute met
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In April 2005, Senators Frank Lautenberg, Barbara Boxer, and Jon
Corzine introduced a bill entitled the "Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals
Act. ' 65 The bill is intended "to establish certain duties for pharmacies
when pharmacists employed by the pharmacies refuse to fill valid
prescriptions for drugs or devices on the basis of personal beliefs, and for
other purposes.
It includes three critical findings:
(1) An individual's right to religious belief and worship is a protected,
fundamental right in the United States. (2) An individual's right to access
legal contraception is a protected, fundamental right in the United States.
(3) An individual's right to religious belief and worship cannot impede
an
67
individual's access to legal prescriptions, including contraception.
The bill would require that, in the event that a pharmacist refuses to
dispense oral contraceptives on the basis of a moral objection, the
pharmacy where he or she works must ensure that another pharmacist fill
the prescription.
The bill would also impose civil penalties of up to
$5000 a day for every pharmacy who violates the Act and would allow
aggrieved individuals to bring civil suits against pharmacies and receive
both punitive and actual damages.6 9 In his presentation of the bill to
Congress, Mr. Lautenberg noted "[the bill] ensures timely access to
contraception and is crucial to protecting a woman's health and
autonomy, and to keeping pharmacists and politicians out of personal,
private matters.,, 70 Mr. Lautenberg further noted that "nobody has a right
to come between any person and their doctor. Not 71the government...
not an insurance company ... and not a pharmacist.",
Prescription contraceptives are now commonplace in society. The
pill is used by millions of women and is recognized by the government
as an important facet of women's comprehensive healthcare.

both the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests. Id.
65. S. 809, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Legal Pharmaceuticals Act] (the bill
was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on Apr.
14, 2005).
66. Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 151 CONG. REc. S3655, 3685 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
71. Id.
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III. Women's Ability to Access Birth Control Is in Danger
In the years following Roe and Casey, some states have sought to
take advantage of the Supreme Court's holding that states may regulate
abortion so long as they ostensibly ensure women have access to
abortion services. 72 Abortion regulations enacted by the states range
from denying indigent women insurance coverage for abortions (through
Medicaid or other forms of state aid) to requiring patient counseling prior
to obtaining an abortion.73 For many people, whether or not a woman
should have an abortion is a black and white issue. Politicians in most
states face the unenviable task of trying to accommodate the concerns of
their constituents who typically feel very strongly for or against the right
of access to abortion services. While abortion rights remain a hotly
contested legal and political issue, contraceptive rights seem positively
innocuous. While there are people whose religion forbids the use of
contraceptives, until recently, the issue rarely became a political or legal
controversy. People who choose not to use contraceptives simply do not
buy them. While certain forms of birth control are subject to federal
regulation for health and safety reasons, it appeared that states no longer
had the authority or desire to prohibit access to contraceptives.
However, recent legislation in South Dakota and other states casts doubt
on this assertion.74
Recent events have propelled contraceptives back into the news and
a seemingly well settled issue is again in controversy.7 5 To understand
these events, one first needs to examine how the birth control pill works
and the controversy regarding when life actually begins.76 Birth control
72. See generally Gary Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Validity,
Under Federal Constitution, of Abortion Laws, 111 L. Ed. 2d 879 (2004) (a

comprehensive review of various approaches states have taken to legislate abortions).
73. Id.; see also Julia Lichtman, Restrictive State Abortion Laws: Today's Most
Powerful Conscience Clause, 10 GEO. J ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 345 (2003)

("restrictions [on abortions] include parental consent requirements, federal restrictions on
the use of public funding to finance abortions, and conscience clauses to protect doctors,
medical personnel, and medical entities from any liability for refusing to perform
abortions."); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abortion and Birth Control § 32 (2004) (discussing instances

where the Supreme Court has upheld statutes which limit government funding for
abortions).
74. See, e.g., South Dakota Statute infra note 103.

75. See news stories infra notes 87-94.
76. For background on how the FDA defines pregnancy for the purposes of
approving contraceptives see Lisa Kaeser, What Methods Should Be Included in a
Contraceptive Coverage Insurance Mandate?, THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC

POLICY, Vol. 1, No. 5, Oct. 1998 available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/01/5/
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pills are made from synthetic hormones that prevent ovulation. 7 In
some cases, however, a woman will release an egg and it may be
fertilized, although the pill prevents the egg from being implanted in the
woman's uterus.78
The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists does not consider a non-implanted egg a pregnancy. 79 As
one doctor notes, "from a medical point of view, pregnancy doesn't take
place until that fertilized egg is implanted in the uterine lining., 80 Some
religious organizations, such as the Roman Catholic Church, believe that
life and conception occur at fertilization. 81 This belief, coupled with a
misunderstanding of how the pill works, has resulted in a perception that
oral contraceptives can terminate a pregnancy and are, therefore, an
abortion agent.8 2 While a percentage of Catholic providers historically
have objected to birth control on religious grounds, 83 the comparison of
chemical birth control to abortion has increased the number of providers
who object to the pill. 84 Physicians who believe pregnancy starts with
grO10501.html.
77. TONE, supra note 1, at 237.
78. Jill McGivering, Pill Propelled Into Abortion Debate, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/americas/3652462.stm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006); see also World News Tonight: A
Closer Look the "Conscience" Laws (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 6, 2004)
[hereinafter World News Tonight]; Contraception: Pharmacist's Refusal to Fill
Emergency Contraception Script Raises Questions, DRUG WEEK, Mar. 19, 2004,
available at http://www.NewsRx.com [hereinafter DRUG WEEK].
79. Claire Hughes, Abortion Debate Enters New Territory; Albany Focus Now on
Women 's Access to Emergency Contraception, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Jan. 22,
2003, at Al.
80. Id.
81. See The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on
Procured Abortion,
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/docu
ments/rc con cfaith doc_1974111 8_declaration-abortionen.html (last visited Jan. 7,
2006); Donald W. Herbe, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a
Pharmacist's Right to Refuse Facilitation ofAbortion and Emergency Contraception, 17
J.L. & HEALTH 77, 86 (2002-2003).
82. McGivering, supra note 78; see also World News Tonight, supra note 78; DRUG
WEEK, supra note 78; Kimberlee Roth, Pharmacists, Doctors Refuse to Dispense Pill on
Moral Grounds, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2004, at Cl; Holly Teliska, Recent
Development, Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the
Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKLEY J. GENDER L.
& JUST. 229, 235 (2005).
83. For background on Catholic hospitals and health care providers, see Kathleen
M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care
Market, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1429 (1995); Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and
Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals,
15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135 (2003).
84. Jeff McDonald, More Health Professionals Balk at Giving Birth Control;
Refusal to Prescribe, Dispense Increases; Moral Grounds Cited, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
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fertilization are refusing to prescribe birth control for their patients on
moral grounds; stating' that participating in the distribution of the pill is
tantamount to participating in an abortion. 85 This trend seems to be
increasing and other providers, including
pharmacists, are also refusing
86
to dispense the pill based on this view.
In March 2004, Julee Lacey, a married woman with two children,
went to her local CVS pharmacy in Texas to pick up a refill of her birth
control pills. 87 The pharmacist told Lacey that she did not believe in
birth control and refused to fill the prescription.88 Lacey was forced to
go to another pharmacy to fill her prescription. 89 A few months earlier,
at another Texas pharmacy, a pharmacist and two co-workers refused to
fill a prescription for emergency contraception (essentially a high dose of
the same hormones that are in the birth control pill) for a rape victim. 90
In 2002, Neil Noesen, a pharmacist in Wisconsin, refused to refill a birth
control prescription for Amanda Phiede, a college student. 91 Noesen not
only refused to fill Phiede's prescription, but he also refused to transfer
the prescription to another pharmacy.92 Noesen claimed it would have
been a sin to participate in filling the prescription.93 These are not
isolated incidents. Across the country, there are dozens of cases of
women who are forced to overcome hurdles to get their birth control
prescriptions filled.94 These occurrences have ignited a firestorm of
TRIBUNE, Aug. 8, 2004, at Al. The dioceses of New York take the position that life
begins at conception but do not equate emergency contraception with an abortion,
especially in cases of rape. Hughes, supra note 79.
85. Roth, supra note 82; McDonald, supra note 84.
86. McDonald, supra note 84. One pharmacist refuses to dispense birth control
because she believes "'it's particularly inefficient in stopping ovulation ....[I]t can stop
human life after it has started."' US PharmacistsSpark Debate by Refusing to Dispense
Contraceptives, Voice of America Press Release & Documents, Nov. 17, 2004
[hereinafter Voice of America].
87. World News Tonight, supra note 78.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. DRUG WEEK, supra note 78.
91. Anita Weier, PrescriptionDilemma; HearingHeldfor Pharmacist Who Denied
Birth Control, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, WI), Oct. 11, 2004, at 1C; Marilyn Gardner,
Pharmacists' Moral Beliefs vs. Women's Legal Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr.
26, 2004, at 11.
92. Weier, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Todd Rosenbaum, Prescribing Ethics, CAVALIER DAILY, Nov. 12, 2004
(column); Roth, supra note 82. Roth notes that since May 2004, at least 180 incidents of
providers who refuse to prescribe or dispense birth control or emergency contraception
have been reported to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Id.
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controversy on both sides of the abortion debate.
The situations highlighted above have not gone unnoticed by
politicians. "Conscience clause" legislation first gained attention in the
1970s after Roe was decided.9 5 All but six states enacted some form of
conscience clause legislation. 96 Twenty-eight states passed legislation
providing limited protection for providers who refuse to participate in
abortion procedures. 97 A handful of other states have legislation that also
protects providers who refuse to dispense contraception.9 8 Most of these
laws are limited to providers such as doctors, nurses, and hospitals.
Some statutes, such as the Health Care Right of Conscience Act in
Illinois, 99 are quite detailed and provide explicit definitions as to what
constitutes an applicable objection, while other state statutes are less
detailed. Every conscience statute seems to have a unique threshold for
objections. For example, Maine allows a physician or private institution
to refuse to provide family planning services when the refusal is based
upon religious or conscious objection. 00 Virginia does not require a
physician to participate in procedures resulting in an abortion if they
state their objection in writing. 10 Missouri protects most health care
providers in both public and private practice from any cause1 of
action
2
relating to their refusal to treat a woman for abortion purposes. 0
95. Statutes with "conscience clauses" are designed to protect the rights of health
care providers who refuse to provide or participate in procedures to which they have a
moral objection. The majority of statutes limit the refusal to the abortion procedure,
although some also include contraceptive and sterilization procedures. See Lynn D.
Wardle, Protectingthe Rights of Conscienceof Health CareProviders, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
177 (1993); see also Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Women in the Catholic Hospital,31
J. LEGIS. 69 (2004).
96. Wardle, supra note 95, at 178. The six states without legislation were Alabama,
Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington (although this is
subject to change in the next year). Id.
97. Bryan A. Dykes, Proposed Rights of Conscience Legislation: Expanding to
Include Pharmacistsand Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L. REv. 565, 586 (2002).
98. Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Oregon, Tennessee, West
Virginia, Wyoming. Wardle, supra note 95, at 178.
99. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 to 70/14 (West 2005).
100. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (2003).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2004).
102. Mo. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2004).
No physician or surgeon, registered nurse, practical nurse, midwife or hospital,
public or private, shall be required to treat or admit for treatment any woman
for the purpose of abortion if such treatment or admission for treatment is
contrary to the established policy of, or the moral, ethical or religious beliefs of,
such physician, surgeon, registered nurse, midwife, practical nurse or hospital.
No cause of action shall accrue against any such physician, surgeon, registered
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In 1998 South Dakota became the first state to offer legal protection
specifically to pharmacists who refuse to dispense medication that they
10 4
10 3
Arkansas has a similar statute.
believe will cause an abortion.
Neither the South Dakota nor Arkansas statutes provide a referral
provision as recommended by the proposed federal legislation.' 0 5 In July
2004, a sweeping statute became effective in Mississippi that allows
health care providers, including pharmacists, to refuse to participate in
procedures that go against their conscience. 10 6 While the Mississippi
statute does not allow discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or
sexual orientation, it does not prohibit a pharmacist from denying
contraceptives to a woman based on her marital status. 10 7 Other states
including Kentucky, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin have also proposed
laws protecting pharmacists. 10 8 By offering pharmacists legal protection
from being fired or having to defend in a civil suit, states with this type
of legislation are protecting one class of individuals at the expense of
another.

nurse, midwife, practical nurse or hospital on account of such refusal to treat or
admit for treatment any woman for abortion purposes.
Id.
103. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2004).
No pharmacist may be required to dispense medication if there is reason to
believe that the medication would be used to: (1) Cause an abortion; or (2)
Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(50A); or (3) Cause
the death of any person by means of an assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy
killing. No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section may be
the basis for any claim for damages against the pharmacist or the pharmacy of
the pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary, recriminatory, or
discriminatory action against the pharmacist.
Id.
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304 (2004). Subsection (5) states in relevant part:
No private institution or physician, nor any agent or employee of such
institution or physician, nor any employee of a public institution acting under
directions of a physician, shall be prohibited from refusing to provide
contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information when the refusal is based
upon religious or conscientious objection. No such institution, employee,
agent, or physician shall be held liable for the refusal.
Id.
105. See, e.g., Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, supra note 65.
106. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-1, -3, -5 (2005).
107. Teliska, supra note 82, at 243-244.
108. Charisse Jones, DruggistsRefuse to Give Out Pill, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2004,
at 3A; see also Rosenbaum, supra note 94; Dykes supra note 97.
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IV. Duty of a Pharmacist
Pharmacist'sProfessionalDuty
According to the Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, a pharmacist has a
professional, legal, and ethical duty to accurately dispense medication
according to the prescription written by a doctor.10 9 Pharmacists are
professionals and "'are expected to exercise special skill and care to
place the interests of their clients above their own immediate interests.'
When a pharmacist's objection directly and detrimentally affects a
patient's health, it follows that the patient should come first." 1 ° The
pharmacist's duty extends to refusing to dispense a medication if he or
she feels it may harm the patient. 11
Examples of when this is
permissible include "if the physician made an error in the strength or
dosage, if a drug interaction is possible, or if it seems, in the pharmacist's
judgement, that the prescription was obtained illegally."' 1 2 As with other
healthcare professionals, a pharmacist's duty to his or her patient is
paramount.
Given the seriousness of the professional obligation, a pharmacist
risks his or her job when he or she does not fulfill this duty. The policies
regarding termination of pharmacists vary between major pharmacy
chains. Most pharmacies, such as Eckerd, will fire pharmacists who do
not fulfill their professional duty.' 1 3 However, when it comes to
contraceptives, one major chain, CVS, does not fire pharmacists who
109. See Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, available at http://www.aphanet.org/
pharmcare/ethics.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). "Central to a pharmacist's
responsibilities is the duty to faithfully and accurately fill prescriptions according to the
terms and instructions written thereon by the prescribing physicians and other authorized
practitioners." Id.; David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of Pharmacist Who
Accurately Fills Prescriptionfor Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R.5th 393, *2a (1996).
An example of the statutory interpretation of this duty can be found in IND. CODE ANN. §
25-26-13-16(b) (LexisNexis 2004) (stating in part: "A pharmacist has a duty to honor all
prescriptions from a practitioner or from a physician, podiatrist, dentist, or veterinarian
licensed under the laws of another state.").
110. Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection-May
PharmacistsRefuse to Fill Prescriptionsfor Emergency Contraception?,351 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 2008-2012, Nov. 4, 2004 (internal citation omitted) (weighing the pros and cons
of pharmacist conscience objections to emergency contraception).
111. Stephanie E. Harvey, et al., Do Pharmacists Have the Right to Refuse to
Dispense a Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?, available at http://www.nmpharmacy.com/body-yights.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
112. Id.
113. Teliska, supra note 82, at 240.
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refuse to dispense." 4 Some chains, such as Walgreens, require the
pharmacist who wishes to abstain from filling a prescription to assist the5
patient in finding another pharmacist who will fill the prescription."
Other pharmacies have policies as to what types of contraceptive items
they will offer. For example, Wal-Mart stocks and dispenses the pill, but
refuses to sell emergency contraception." 16
In Ohio, Karen Brauer was fired from her job at K-Mart when she
refused to fill a prescription for birth control." 17 Neil Noesen is currently
118
facing disciplinary charges arising from his refusal to dispense the pill.
In Julee Lacey's case, the pharmacist was allowed to keep her job,
although in the other Texas case, both Gene Herr (the pharmacist) and
his two co-workers (who also refused to help the customer) were fired." 19
As with the abortion debate, laws supporting conscience objections
have passionate opponents and supporters. As an illustration, noted
below are two letters to the editor of a Wisconsin newspaper, written in
the midst of the Noesen hearing. One reader wrote in opposition to
Noesen's actions, pointing out that birth control pills can be used to treat
other medical problems and are not always prescribed for
contraception.120 The reader stated:
While I respect pharmacist Neil Noesen's religious beliefs, it is not his job
to tell someone, based on those beliefs, what medical treatment they should
receive .... It is not the pharmacist's job to make medical decisions;
their
12 1
[sic] job is to fill the prescription as written by the physician.
Writing in response to this letter, another reader stated:
Noesen's only choice that day was whether he would violate his conscience
by providing a medication that would be used to frustrate the patient's
natural, normal and healthy bodily functions .... It doesn't require an
M.D. certificate to know which choice was appropriate. It only requires a
114. Jill Filipovic, Whose Conscience Counts?, WASHINGTON SQUARE NEWS (via
U-Wire), Oct. 20, 2004. Eckerd, for example, has a policy that states that no pharmacists
can ever choose not to fill a prescription solely on moral or religious grounds. DRUG
WEEK, supra note 78.
115. DRUG WEEK, supra note 78.
116. McDonald, supra note 84.
117. Voice of America, supra note 86.
118. Weier, supra note 91.
119. DRUG WEEK, supra note 78.

120. A.M. Bartlett, Middleton, Letter to the Editor, Pharmacist Shouldn't Do
M.D. 's Job by Deciding on Patient's Medications, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, WI), Oct.
16, 2004, at lIA.
121. Id.
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genuine love for neighbor, a well-formed conscience and the courage to act
appropriately, none of which should be discouraged by any institution. 122
These quotes show how strongly people feel about conscience
objections and the interactions those objections have with personal
freedoms. Some clearly believe the right to patient autonomy is superior
to a pharmacist's convictions, while others believe that pharmacists
should not be forced to compromise his or her beliefs.
Ms. Brauer, Mr. Noesen, Mr. Herr, and other pharmacists who have
been fired represent one group of casualties in this battle between
conscience and professional duty. On the other side are the patients who
have had their rights violated and, perhaps, their health compromised.
The American Pharmacists Association has a policy that permits
moral objections by pharmacists as long as the pharmacist makes a
referral for the patient.1 23 The Association acknowledges that "'there
needs to be an alternative system in place to ensure patient access to
legally prescribed therapy."'' 1 24 However, not all pharmacists are willing
to make a referral or ensure a patient has an alternative. Ms. Brauer,
currently the President of a group called Pharmacists for Life
International, says "'[t]he suggestion that a pharmacist who refuses to
dispense a drug which can kill a human should refer the patient to
another person who will dispense a drug which can kill a human is
ridiculous' ..... 'There should not be an expectation to refer. It's another
expectation to participate."'' 125 Even if a pharmacist provides a referral,
the patient must often wait upwards of a day or more to get her
prescription filled. This is time that patients cannot always afford.
1 26 and a delay in
Contraceptives are only effective when taken regularly
127
taking the pill can compromise its effectiveness.
Pharmacist'sLegal Duty
Beyond their professional duty to correctly dispense medicine,
pharmacists have a legal duty to their patients. 128 Pharmacists have a
122. Mark Kimble, Madison, Letter to the Editor, PharmacistMade Moral Choice,
(Madison, WI), Oct. 20, 2004, at 1 A.
123. Rosenbaum, supra note 94.
124. Roth, supra note 82.
125. Voice of America, supra note 86.
126. Feminist Women's Health Center, The Pill-OralContraceptives, http://www.
fwhc.org/birth-control/thepill.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
127. Marchitelli, supra note 109.

CAPITAL TIMES

128. Id.
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common law duty to a patient to accurately dispense medication.129
Pharmacists, like other medical professionals, may also be liable in
"wrongful birth" tort actions.1 30 Extrapolating the legal reasoning behind
the common law duty to dispense medicine correctly, one may find this
legal duty also requires pharmacists to dispense prescribed birth control.
In Troppi v. Scar]'31 a pharmacist mistakenly gave tranquilizers,
instead of birth control, to a patient and, as a result, the woman got
pregnant. 3 2 The court found the pharmacist's actions negligent and
133
wrongful and found that they directly and proximately caused damage.
The court then allowed the woman to sue for damages. 134 The court
stated that public policy made tort liability appropriate:
[P]ublic policy favors a tort scheme which encourages pharmacists to
exercise great care in filling prescriptions. To absolve defendant of all
liability here would be to remove one deterrent against the negligent
dispensing of drugs. Given the great numbers of women who currently use
oral contraceptives, such absolution cannot be defended on public policy
grounds. 135
Troppi set the standard for tort liability for pharmacists.
In Hooks SuperX v. McLaughlin,136 a customer sued his pharmacist
for continuing to fill his prescription for a dangerous and addictive
drug. 137 In holding that the pharmacist had an obligation to prevent, or at
least question, the customer's rapid rate of pill consumption the court
stated, "[t]he relationship between pharmacist and customer is a direct
one based upon contract and is independent of the relationship between
physician and patient."' 38 The court went on to say that "privity of
contract is a relationship sufficient to form the basis for tort liability." 3 9
Because customers rely upon pharmacists for their expertise, the court
concluded that pharmacists had a legal duty to their customers. 40
129. Id.
130. Gregory G. Samo, Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to
Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (2004).
131. 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at517.
642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994).
Id. at516.
Id. at 517 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at517.
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In Rift v. Morgan Pharmacy,'4' a patient sued her doctor and
pharmacy for negligently prescribing and filling a prescription without
warning her of the dosage requirements and the side effects.142 The court
found for the patient and against the pharmacy, noting that "[p]ublic
policy requires that pharmacists who prepare and dispense drugs and
medicines for use in the human body must be held responsible for the
failure to exercise the degree of care and vigilance commensurate
with
143
the harm which would be likely to result from relaxing it.'
The pharmacist's legal duty is not absolute.'4 The pharmacist must
have a reason to suspect that harm will come to the patient from the
prescription. 145 Otherwise, "where the pharmacist has no specific
knowledge of an increased danger to a particular customer, the
pharmacist has no duty to warn that customer of potential side effects.' 46
In Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 47 a young man visiting his grandmother
mistakenly took one of her diabetes pills, believing it was aspirin. 48 The
man suffered a severe reaction to the drug, resulting in permanent brain
damage. 49 The man's guardian sued the drug manufacturer, physician,
and pharmacist. ' ° The court granted summary judgment to the
defendants holding, in part, that the pharmacist's duty to warn does not
extend to injuries that are not reasonably foreseeable.' 15 Some state
legislatures have made the duty of a pharmacist even clearer. The
Supreme Court of Washington interpreted its state law defining the
standard of care for health care providers to include pharmacists and
noted that "'[a pharmacist] has no duty to fail or refuse to supply a
customer with drugs for which the customer has a valid and lawful
prescription from a licensed physician ....
While the courts and pharmacist community seem to agree that
141. 508 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
142. Id. at 1248.
143. Id.at 1251.
144. See Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining
Pharmacists'Legal Responsibilities, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 417 (1998); Marchitelli, supra
note 109.
145. Id.
146. Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 821 (Mass. 2002).
147. 890 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. 1994).
148. Id. at 426.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. McKee v. Am. Home Prods., Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Wash. 1989)
(quoting Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d. 561, 561-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
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pharmacists have a duty to accurately dispense medication, they do not
agree as to whether the pharmacist can withhold dispensing due to moral
objections. The pharmacy profession is run at the state level, with each
53
state determining the qualifications it will require of its pharmacists.
To date there is no national standard regarding what, if any, legal or
professional boundaries should be placed on pharmacists with conscious
objections. Legislators add to this confusion by passing laws that,
seemingly, either support or do not support a pharmacist's right to make
a moral objection, making geographic location a factor in a woman's
ability to access birth control.
V. Should Pharmacists Be Protected From Termination
When They Refuse to Dispense?
The Argument in Favor of Giving Legal Protectionto PharmacistsWho
Refuse to Dispense Due to Moral Objections
In an article discussing the pros and cons of the rights of
pharmacists to raise a conscience objection, Julie Cantor' 54 and Ken
Baum155 reason that pharmacists cannot be asked to completely abandon
their morals for the sake of their profession.' 56 The authors believe that
to do so would "impose too heavy a toll.' 57 In an article advocating for
protection of pharmacists' conscience objections, another author argues
that "[t]he public benefits when pharmacists can freely exercise their
automony [sic] and refuse to participate in medical services that violate
their conscience."' 158 Others believe that conscience objections must be
allowed in order to protect a pharmacist's constitutionally protected free
exercise of religion. 59 Proponents of pharmacist protection further
believe Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (protecting
against religious discrimination in the workplace) is an inadequate
153. For a list of licensing requirements by state see the chart at http://www.
visalaw.com/IMG/pharmacistchart.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
154. Ms. Cantor holds a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley's
Boalt Hall School of Law and a MD from the Yale University School of Medicine.
http://www.mto.com/lawyers/bio/cfm?attorney 1O=289 (last visited Nov. 2, 2005).
155. Dr. Baum completed a joint MD/JD program at Yale University School of
Medicine and Yale Law School. Id.
156. Cantor & Baum, supra note 110.
157. Id.
158. Dykes, supra note 97, at 586.
159. Weier,supra note 91.
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of pharmacists who make
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The ethical challenges faced by pharmacists are not limited to the
issues of birth control and abortion. In a paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society for Pharmacy Law, William L. Allen
and David B. Brushwood argue that it is appropriate for a pharmacist to
raise a conscience objection to other medications if the pharmacist feels
the prescribed therapy is morally objectionable and note that "the
pharmacist is an active participant [in drug therapy] whose values,
attitudes, and beliefs should be given consideration."'1 61 The authors also
note that conscience objections are not always limited to a pharmacist
who wishes to opt out of dispensing medication. They point out that for
some pharmacists their conscience may demand that they participate in
the dispensing of certain medications. 62 In conclusion, the authors
suggest that state-owned pharmacies allow pharmacists to observe the
demands of their consciences, while private pharmacies
adopt their own
63
polices to which the pharmacist must adhere.
For some proponents of conscience legislation, there is no
compromise. One author suggests that the best solution is to enact
164
federal and state legislation to provide legal protection to pharmacists.
This proponent suggests that "[l]egal protection must serve two purposes
in order to appropriately ensure a pharmacist's right of conscientious
refusal: 1) prevent and deter detrimental recriminatory action against the
pharmacist; and 2) provide adequate remedies in the case where the
pharmacist is sued or disciplined."'' 65 The author reasons that because
other healthcare providers are legally allowed to refuse to participate in
an abortion procedure, pharmacists should be granted the same
protection. 66 Another proponent of legal protection suggests that
conscience legislation is necessary to protect health care provider
autonomy: "[i]deally, such legislation should allow health care providers
to practice their skills in an integrated manner, maintaining their
religious, philosophical, ethical, and moral integrity when they encounter

160. Herbe, supra note 81, at 93.
161. William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, PharmaceuticallyAssisted Death
and the Pharmacist'sRight of Conscience, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAW 1, 1 (1996).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Herbe, supra note 81, at 100.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 77.
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requests or assignments that violate their conscience.

'' 67

Proponents of statutes protecting pharmacists also argue that the
pharmacist's fundamental right to free exercise of religion is at stake. 68
If a pharmacist's religion is the reason for his or her objection, they may
claim protection under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964,169 which states, in part, that employers may not "refuse to hire...
discharge... or otherwise discriminate against any individual...
because of such individual's ...religion."'' 70 However, in the workplace,
the right of free exercise of religion is not absolute, nor is Title VII a
guarantee of protection.' 7 ' Although the employer has an obligation to
accommodate the religious practices of an employee, "the employee has
a correlative duty to make a good faith attempt to satisfy his needs
through means offered by the employer. A reasonable accommodation
need not be on the employee's terms only."' 172 If an employee's
objections cause undue burden to an employer he or she may still face
termination. 73 Hence, proponents argue that conscience clause
legislation is necessary to protect individuals who may not qualify for
protection under Title VII.
The Argument Against ProvidingLegal Protection to Pharmacists Who
Refuse to Dispense Due to Moral Objections
After evaluating many of the arguments for and against legal
protection for pharmacists, Cantor and Baum came to the conclusion that
it may be impossible, in all cases, to protect the rights of both the
pharmacist and the patient. 7
This is especially true in rural
communities served by a single pharmacist. 75 In those cases they come
down on the side of the patient, concluding:
Our principle of a compassionate duty of care should apply to all health

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
employee
174.
175.

Dykes, supra note 97, at 568.
Herbe, supra note 81, at 94.
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2004).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2004).
Herbe, supra note 81, at 94.
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982).
Herbe, supra note 81, at 94-95 (discussing all the potential burdens that an
may place upon an employer that would not result in Title VII protection).
Cantor & Baum, supra note 110.
Voice of America, supra note 86; see also Lichtman, supra note 73

(discussing the adverse impact to poor and underserved women in rural areas with few
abortion providers and strict abortion regulations).
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care professionals. In a secular society, they must be prepared to limit the
reach of their personal objection. Objecting pharmacists may choose to find
employment opportunities that comport with their morals-in a religious
community, for example-but when they pledge to serve the public, it is
unreasonable to expect
176 those in need of health care to acquiesce to their
personal convictions.
Susan Scrimshaw, Dean of the University of Illinois-Chicago
School of Public Health, feels that low-income and rural women will be
disproportionately affected by legislation that allows a pharmacist to
refuse to dispense. 177 Scrimshaw notes "'if you don't have a car and
you're in a neighborhood with few pharmacies, you're in trouble [in
terms of accessing contraceptives].' 7 8
Other critics of conscience objection clauses challenge the notion of
pharmacist protection on the grounds that "moral conviction" is an ill179
defined term and that it can be used to foster discriminatory behavior.
As one critic suggests, "this legislation creates somewhat of a slippery
slope in terms of pharmacists' discretion. For instance, if a racist
pharmacist was opposed to dispensing heart disease medication to
blacks, could he refuse to do so based on so-called moral
convictions?" 180 And others object to the notion that one person's moral
By allowing a
viewpoint can be legally imposed upon another.
pharmacist to refuse to dispense, the pharmacist is interfering with both
the will and rights of the patient and his or her physician. These
opponents state that "[it is] outrageous that someone can deny someone
access to the health care services that their physician has prescribed for
Rosemary Ellis182 points out an unexpected irony that may
them." 18'
result from lack of birth control access: "[I]n not making the pill
available to women, inevitably, more unintended pregnancies and more
abortions are going to happen."' 83 As a result, she feels that the moral
stand taken by pharmacists may soon undermine public health and

176. Cantor & Baum, supra note 110, at 9.
177. Market Watch: Debate Over ContraceptionAccess Reignites (CBS television
broadcast May 13, 2004); see also Teliska, supra note 82 (discussing the adverse impact

that pharmacist refusal clauses have on the health needs of rural and low income women).
178. Market Watch, supra note 177.
179. Rosenbaum, supra note 94.
180. Id.
181. Voice of America, supra note 86.
182. Rosemary Ellis is the Editorial Director of Prevention magazine. Id.
183. New Medical Trend: Women Who Were Denied Birth Control, The Flipside
(CNN Television Broadcast July 14, 2004).
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safety.
By forcing employers to retain employees who do not perform their
jobs, legislators are also burdening employers. As the court in Brener v.
Diagnostic Center Hospital'85 stated, if by accommodating a person's
religious practice an employer's business faces an undue hardship, then
accommodation is not required. 8 6 The Supreme Court seems to agree
with the Brener holding. A few years later the Court held that "an
employer has met its obligation under [the Civil Rights Act of 1964]
when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to
the employee."' 8 7 Furthermore the Court has noted that "an individual's
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."'' 88 While
Brener addressed protection under Title VII, opponents of conscience
clause legislation would argue that the same rules should be applied to
statutes protecting pharmacists. The actions of an objecting pharmacist
are likely to cause a hardship to his or her employer. If there are multiple
pharmacists on duty, an objecting pharmacist will require his or her
coworkers to fill extra prescriptions, thereby increasing their workload
and decreasing their morale. If the objecting pharmacist is alone, he or
she will be turning away customers in order to accommodate his or her
objection.
An employer is thus burdened both operationally and
financially by being required to accommodate objecting pharmacists.
It is clear that both the proponents and opponents of pharmacist
protection are concerned with rights, whether they are the rights of a
pharmacist to his or her moral and religious convictions or the rights of a
patient to privacy, health and choice. In assessing the arguments, the
courts must carefully balance the impact of restriction and
accommodation and try to construct a policy that will, hopefully, result
in the least amount of infringement upon the rights of the affected
parties.
184. Id. For another review of the public policy and health issues related to
contraceptive use, see EPICC Bill, supra note 61.
185. 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).

186. Id. at 146.
187. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
188. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79

(1990)

(noting,

"'[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.
The mere possession of
religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does
not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities."') Id. (internal
citation omitted).
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VI. The Consequences of Legal Protection for Pharmacists
and Suggested Causes of Action
While laws protecting the conscience of health care providers have
been around for a long time, laws protecting pharmacists are relatively
new. When a state protects a pharmacist from the consequences of
refusing to dispense birth control, the state is, in effect, denying a patient
her constitutional rights. To analyze these statutes one must look at the
nature of the right being restricted and how the statute could be
challenged. Laws that protect pharmacists from the consequences of
failing to dispense prescriptions interfere with patients' access to oral
contraceptives. The right to access contraceptives is covered by the right
to privacy. 8 9 The right of privacy is a fundamental right under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, a denial of these rights constitutes
a substantive due process violation.
Although there has not been a case on this specific issue, it is
reasonable to expect that a woman who is denied access to birth control
by a pharmacist (who is protected by state law), could successfully bring
suit under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following are some suggested
arguments that a plaintiff might make, should he or she wish to challenge
a statute that offers legal protection to a pharmacist who refuses to
dispense the pill.
In order to set forth a Fourteenth Amendment claim, a state actor
must violate a protected right of an individual. 9 ° A statute can be
attacked either on its face (looking only at the language of the statute) or
as applied (looking at the effect of the statute). In reviewing whether the
statute is unconstitutional as applied, the court will look at how the law
works in practice and if the result interferes with a person's
constitutional rights. If the statute interferes with a right, the court will
look at the nature of the right. When the right violated has been found by
the Court to be fundamental, then the statute will be subject to strict

189. Schopler, supra note 32.
[O]ne aspect of "liberty" protected by [the] due process clause of Fourteenth
Amendment is right of personal privacy, or guaranty of certain areas or zones of
privacy; this right of personal privacy includes interest in independence in making
certain kinds of decisions, and among the decisions that an individual may make
without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.
Id. (emphasis added).
190. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
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scrutiny.' 9 1 "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court
has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest' and that legislative enactments must be
'1 92
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."
This heightened level of scrutiny is the appropriate level of analysis for
cases involving any statute that provides a bar to access to birth control
because the right of access to contraceptives falls within the fundamental
right to privacy.1 93 As the Court in Eisenstadt stated, "if we were to
conclude that the ... statute [at issue] impinges upon fundamental

freedoms under Griswold, the statutory classification would have to be
not merely rationally related to a valid public1 purpose
but necessary to
94
the achievement of a compelling state interest."
A statute does not necessarily need to act as a complete bar to
access in order to be found unconstitutional. The Court has held that
"infringements of fundamental rights are not limited to outright denials
of those rights .... [T]he compelling-state-interest test is applicable not

only to outright denials but also to restraints that make exercise of those
rights more difficult."'' 95 Therefore, a state that interferes with a
fundamental right, or which makes access more difficult, is subject to a
strict standard of review.
Because there is no medical support to show that oral contraceptives
are abortion agents, the law applied to statutes restricting access to
pharmaceuticals should apply the strict scrutiny test. However, even if a
court were to apply the less rigorous, "undue burden" test used in
abortion cases,1 96 the state must still show an important interest.197
191. Id.
192. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
193. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 448.
194. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 447 n.7.
195. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 487 (1977).
196. With issues around abortion, the strict scrutiny level of review has been
replaced with the less rigorous and more confusing "undue burden" standard defined in
Casey. In Casey, a plurality of three Justices concluded that "not all [abortion]
regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether
to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the
appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally
protected liberty." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992). The Court
further noted that "not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso
facto, an infringement of that right." Id. at 873 (Per Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter).
197. Id. at 876. The undue burden standard was first suggested in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which states that a statute that restricts
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Because the states do not have a compelling, or even important,
interest in denying women access to contraceptives, the statutes that
provide protection to pharmacists violate the substantive due process
rights of women. The state must show that the statute in question is
pursuing a compelling objective and that the means chosen by the state
are necessary to achieve the compelling end. 198 If there are less
restrictive means that would accomplish the same objective, then the
means are not necessary and the state's statute will be held
unconstitutional. 199

The following is a hypothetical application of the strict scrutiny test
to the South Dakota statute. South Dakota has some of the most
restrictive laws regarding abortion and is one of only a few states that
allow a pharmacist to refuse to dispense the pill or other
contraceptives. 200 South Dakota is a predominantly rural state and is
sparsely populated. 20 ' Accordingly, if a pharmacist refuses to dispense
the pill, the patient may have a difficult time filling her prescription (or
she may never be able to fill it). By passing a statute that protects the
pharmacist from legal action from his or her employer and/or the patient,
the state action has essentially barred patients from accessing their
medication.
The purpose of the South Dakota statute is, ostensibly, to protect the
religious and moral values of pharmacists who object to birth control
and/or abortion.2 °2
Presumably, the state interest is to protect
pharmacists (and other healthcare providers) from having to compromise
abortion will be deemed unconstitutional only if its purpose or effect is to place

substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Id. Critics of the undue
burden standard point out that "the Court did not explain how it could abandon strict
scrutiny while emphatically reaffirming 'a constitutional liberty of the woman to have
some freedom to terminate her pregnancy."' Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law:
Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 77, 145 (1995) (citation omitted); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme

Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106

HARV.

L. REv.

22 (1992).
198. See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).

199. Id.
200. Lichtman, supra note 73, at 353 (observing that in the past ten years South
Dakota has passed 15 laws restricting abortions).
201. See U.S. census data for South Dakota, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/46000.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).

202. This is a reasonable inference based on the language of the statute, the result of
the legislation, as well as the fact that an extremely small percentage of South Dakota's
state legislature is pro-choice. Lichtman, supra note 73.
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their moral values due to participation in allegedly objectionable
activities. To pass the strict scrutiny test the state would need to show
that this state interest is compelling and that the interest cannot be
achieved by less restrictive means. 2°3 Applying the undue burden test,
the state would need to show that its actions are not intended to deny
women access to contraceptives.
The state's interest in protecting pharmacist's moral objections to
birth control is in direct conflict with its citizens' interest in maintaining
their fundamental and constitutionally protected right of protection from
state interference regarding access to contraceptives. Unlike cases
involving the rights to education or marriage, the state does not possess
paternalistic power to interfere with women's rights to birth control.2 °4
Any law that interferes with a fundamental right cannot be allowed to
stand absent a compelling state interest. The state's actions are not
narrowly tailored to avoid significant interference with women's
fundamental rights. The South Dakota statute allows pharmacists to
escape liability for their actions and does not provide for any recourse
(such as a referral requirement or having a non-objecting pharmacist on
staff) for women who encounter an objecting pharmacist. Accordingly
the statute (and any others written without a referral clause) should be
found unconstitutional and re-written to ensure that contraceptive access
is not completely cut-off.
VII. Conclusion
Offering legal protection to pharmacists comes at too great a cost to
women's health and legal rights. The pill is a viable and effective
method of birth control for many women and, as Congress has noted, it

203. The pharmacists might argue that if they were not protected, they are facing
religious discrimination. When a plaintiff claims religious discrimination, there must be
interference in the plaintiffs religious purpose. Here the pharmacists have a secular
purpose (dispensing medication) and a statute that requires the dispensing of valid
prescriptions would probably not be found in violation of the Establishment Clause. For
a discussion of the Establishment Clause and contraceptive access see Catholic Charities
of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
204. See Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Plaintiffs asked
the court to hold the law preventing minors from marrying without parental consent to be
declared an unconstitutional infringement on their fundamental right to marry. The court
declined to use the strict scrutiny test, holding that because the plaintiffs' right was
merely postponed it was not the same as a law (such as the one struck down in Carey)
forbidding access to contraceptives.).
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can be used to prevent other social, economic, and medical problems. °5
The Supreme Court has clearly established that a state cannot interfere
with a woman's right to access contraceptives, including the pill. While
pharmacists should be free to practice their religion, that practice cannot
interfere with their professional duty to dispense valid prescriptions free
of moral judgment. Furthermore, the vague wording in most conscience
clause statutes does not restrict objections to those of a religious nature.
A pharmacist can use any personal moral objection as an excuse not to
dispense a prescription. The result of a pharmacist's objection can be
quite severe for the patient (an unintended pregnancy or health
problems), and the duties imposed under tort law should apply. A
pharmacist should not be able to escape the legal consequences of his or
her actions. States that allow pharmacists to do so are clearly protecting
the rights of a small segment of their citizens at the expense of others.
If these statutes are challenged in court, it is likely that the statutes
will be found to be unconstitutional. While this is a serious consequence,
it is appropriate given the rights at stake.

205. See EPICC Bill, supra note 61; see also Legal Pharmaceuticals Act, supra
note 65.
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